BALOCHISTAN bled again this past week — for the rest of the country. In reality, it is the part of the homeland that has rarely ever stopped bleeding over the past 20 years. But for those of us who live a long way from the province, we only become aware of the festering wound when the sepsis sets in. And that is what happened last week with the incidents in Quetta and Ziarat. The manner in which the events unfolded in Ziarat was heart-breaking and by the time the attack took place in Lasbela, the death toll was far too horrific to even comprehend. But there is a greater tragedy. And that is the inability of those in power to approach the crisis in Balochistan with any empathy and political will to heal. The causes of the ailment have been discussed at length — the alienation of the people; the rise of the middle class youth and the roots of its anger; the absence of a genuine political process. It is a political problem that needs a political solution, along with counter-insurgency operations. The people need healing and for that there has to be a dialogue with those in the political mainstream and also those who have been imprisoned. Instead, there are unrepresentative governments, harsh language, jail sentences, enforced disappearances and sheer use of violence. And it hasn’t worked. Last week’s events illustrated as much. This is not just anecdotal information. Research reports show the increasing number of attacks in Balochistan. A recent report — Cognitive Warfare and Insurgent Legitimacy by the Institute of Regional Studies — details the TTP’s communication strategy, pointing out that while attacks in KP fell by 57 per cent in the first quarter of 2026, they increased by 84pc in Balochistan. But it is not just about the attention-drawing attacks; even otherwise, there is hardly any state writ in the province outside of a few areas. By all accounts, it is next to impossible to drive around the province, despite the chief minister’s claims that he drove to Ziarat in a non-bullet proof car. But then, he and other government officials are unwilling to acknowledge the crisis there, let alone addressing it. Those in power are unable to approach the crisis in Balochistan with the political will to heal. This time, as previously, they spared little effort to demonstrate that there is going to be no change in strategy. From the prime minister to provincial officials to those who manage security, each tragedy provides an opportunity to express grief, condemnation and announce a resolve to go after each and every terrorist. There is no debate on the failures and the need for a change in tactics or strategy. The state reaction is now a formality bereft of any meaning. Despite this, the recent attacks have not only highlighted familiar issues but have also brought into focus some new aspects. The presence of organisations such as the TTP or other similar terrorists in parts of Balochistan is now confirmed. If earlier this was whispered, it is now being publicly acknowledged by the government and the military whose media talk after the three recent attacks made this clear, as did other statements. It appears that the events near Quetta and in Ziarat are being linked to them rather than Baloch militants. And the presence of the Taliban appears to be in the Pakhtun parts of Balochistan. People familiar with the province say that their presence dates back to the fall of Kabul but that their ‘activity’ is more recent. Second, the anger of the people on the appearance of the terrorists and what they see as the ‘betrayal’ or apathy of the government officials is more than obvious. From the protest sit-ins to their statements on social media, the anger is palpable. Their anger is not just about attacks and the loss of life but also the manner in which the ill-equipped policemen were left to defend themselves. Questions were also raised about why the men were sent there, why there was no back-up and why did requests for help go unanswered. The protesters are alleging that relatives had to arrange for bringing the bodies of some of the martyred men themselves with little official help. It is hard to know how correct all of this is because official circles keep ignoring these social media conversations. It may be far better to address the allegations head on, as well as address the feelings of alienation among some of the protesters. This would go a long way in addressing some other reports about police resignations. The morale of those supposed to lead the operations should be critical at such moments. A linked point here is that in the absence of a clear ‘narrative’ (a popular word these days) from the government, the vacuum will be filled by problematic stories and accounts. This is already obvious because it seems some of the local residents are now convinced of some deeper conspiracy behind the rising terrorist attacks; some of them have voiced the idea that a security situation is being created to take over land. This is rather reminiscent of the later years of Musharraf and afterwards, when the people of the afflicted districts in then Fata and KP questioned the state’s actual intentions towards the Taliban. As the attacks grew, it was a commonly held perception that the government was reluctant to fight. This simply allowed the Taliban to gain strength and wreak havoc. And once the military operations began in earnest, there was a concerted effort to convince the people and those fighting that the threat was real and existential. In fact, in some ways, the effort to change public perceptions began before the fighting. In other words, to some of us it seems the failure of those in power to address the public perception is an admission that there is little will to address the crisis in Balochistan. Not so far. The writer is a journalist. Published in Dawn, July 14th, 2026